Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 27 Fall 2009

              Pragmatic Moralism and
the Politieization of Philosophy1
Santayana's foreground-privileging critique of Dewey, David Dilworth has
recently claimed, anticipated "the entire gamut of transcendentalist,
phenomenological, pragmatic, and historicist styles that flourished in Dewey's
day and continue to flourish in today's academy."2 I think it is appropriate to term the
trend Dilworth has in mind here the politieization of philosophy, especially as it
developed after 1950. If Dilworth is correct, Santayana's foreground critique
implicates much more than simply Dewey's pragmatism. This merits consideration;
here I restrict myself to the charge as Santayana makes it against Dewey's pragmatism,
and conclude with the suggestion that a contemporary strain of pragmatism can be
seen to prominently display the problem. This could set up for future consideration the
larger claim Dilworth puts forth.
Santayana called in his day the politicizing one finds in contemporary
philosophy "moralism." He identified two forms of "moralism." The first, "moralism
proper," according to Santayana, is a species of Kantianism, where "the categorical
imperative of an absolute reason or duty determining right judgment and conduct" is
asserted.3 Kant's philosophy "conceived that duty was something absolute and not a
method of securing whatever goods of all sorts are attainable by action,"4 The
shortcomings of such absolutism of duty in the philosophy of Kant have been much
discussed by a wide variety of philosophers, including Deweyan pragmatists, yet
amazingly, the tendency persists among contemporary ethicists striving for exclusively
"normative" moral theories. Such theorists follow the absolutism in Kant in so far as
they hold out for the possibility of establishing standardized ethical norms that are
capable of guiding conduct, as though conduct is so exclusively and neatly capable, or
even in need of, guidance by norms.
But Santayana identifies a second form of moralism, one that implicates Deweyan
pragmatists as well. He calls the second form of moralism "a principle of cosmology
and religion [asserting] the actual dominance of reason or goodness over the universe
at large."5 It would be amusing news both to Dewey and to Deweyan pragmatists to
be called moralistic cosmologists. What can Santayana mean in the charge?
Santayana suspected that Dewey protested cosmic absolutism too much, and
failed to admit the commitments made in his own metaphysical appeals, including his
appeal to the self-sufficing character of empirical "traits" or appearances.   This is a
1 This article is a significantly revised and condensed version of a same-titled article appearing in
Umbo, Num. 29, 2009, pp. 21-38, ISSN: 0210-1602. The author wishes to extend his gratitude to
participants, including Larry Hickman, in the "American and European Values" Dewey
conference held in Opole, Poland, in June 2009. After delivering an early version of this paper
the author received valuable feedback from participants in post-talk discussions.
2 David Dilworth. "Santayana's Review of Dewey's Experience and Nature: Pivotal Expression
of a Philosophy of Nature and Vivacious Spirit." Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana
Society, No. 219 mi 2003:
http://www.mam.uwaterloo.ca/~kerri^
Accessed as of 3/25/09.
3 PGS, "Apologia," 502.
4 George Santayana. Egotism in German Philosophy. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915:107.
5 PGS, "Apologia," 502.