Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 23 Fall 2005

              T
Skepticism, Romanticism
and "Penitent Art"
he title of Joel Porte's thoughtful essay "Artifices of Eternity: The Ideal and the
Real in Stevens and Williams" does not promise a rounded portrait, or any
portrait at all, of George Santayana, who figures in the discussion primarily as
an influence on Wallace Stevens.1 The essay deserves to be judged on its own
terms, as a study of key similarities and differences between the two poets mentioned
in its title, and on that basis it certainly merits high praise. For this student of
Santayana, however, there are aspects of Porte's treatment of the philosopher that are
troubling beyond the unavoidable incompleteness of the portrait. Porte may be entirely
correct in his characterizations of Wallace Stevens and William Carlos Williams, but
his brief portrait of George Santayana seems misleading in regard to his skepticism
(always "scepticism" for Santayana), his conception of essences, and his attitude
toward mysticism. On each of these topics, Porte assimilates Santayana's views to
Stevens'. Indeed, in "Artifices of Eternity" Santayana's philosophy figures primarily
as a prose counterpart to Stevens' poetic vision. There certainly are parallels to be
explored; Stevens' great poem "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" and his essay
"Imagination as Value" offer impressive testimony about the significance of the
philosopher for the poet. Yet Santayana's essay "Penitent Art," unmentioned by Porte,
suggests that the philosopher's view of the literary modernism exemplified in different
ways by both Stevens and Williams differed considerably from that held by the poets
themselves. Most Importantly, Santayana's lifelong critique of romanticism needs to
be taken into account in considering his relationship to two poets whose works both
extend and enrich the romantic tradition. Disputing his characterization of George
Santayana may seem an ungracious response to Joel Porte's valuable discussion of
Wallace Stevens and William Carlos Williams, but it will be a useful exercise if it
succeeds in serving as a reminder of some of the distinctive qualities of Santayana's
thought.
Porte's statement that in Scepticism and Animal Faith "Santayana was at pains to
lead the reader, step by step, to what he calls 'ultimate scepticism' " is not wrong, but
it is misleading if it is taken as an accurate though concise statement of Santayana's
purpose in the book. Emphasizing and perhaps overstating, at least by implication,
Santayana's skepticism, Porte's essay does not even mention, let alone give due weight
to, the second term in the title of Scepticism and Animal Faith, Yet it is by means of
this latter conception that Santayana accounts for the world as it is experienced in
everyday life. In formulating the notion of "animal faith" Santayana was, in his view,
simply making explicit and philosophically coherent the assumptions on which non-
philosophers depend in everyday life; as he says in the introduction, he was not
inventing a new philosophy but "giving to everyday beliefs a more accurate and
circumspect form" (saf 3), an enterprise that demanded not so much cleverness as the
rarer qualities of "candour and courage" (saf 7). One who learned of Scepticism and
Animal Faith only through Porte's essay would be surprised to discover that Santayana
has already arrived at "ultimate scepticism" halfway through the book; "scepticism,"
however ultimate, is for Santayana not a destination but rather a stage on a journey or,
better yet, preparation for a journey.   Santayana is just getting ready to begin his
1 This paper was read to the Santayana Society at its annual meeting hi Boston on December 29,
2004