Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 19 Fall 2001

              A Conversation, Partly Real
and Partly Imaginary
The following dialogue is a literal transcription of part of a typescript extant in the Charles A.
Strong Papers (Box 7, Folder 104) at the Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York,
and is printed here by their permission. Apparently these notes were typed by Strong following a
philosophical debate between him and Santayana, and then mailed to Santayana. These pages with
Santayana's handwritten comments were then enclosed with the 1 March 1932 letter to Strong.
The dialogue is the work of Strong, and only the inserted comments in a changed italic font are
written by Santayana. The first paragraph of the accompanying letter reads:
Dear Strong: I return your latest manifesto with a few notes on the parts put into my unworthy
mouth. Though I should have used different word's [sic], like Gretchen's parson, I might
perhaps not have said anything more valuable.   I am vaguely conscious that in our verbal
discussions, of late years, I have been a good deal of a dummy. As for your elucidations, I find
the word luminosity in them, but not the thing, and I had better abstain from commentaries
which would surely seem to you only blind and irritating. ... G.S.
The full typescript along with editorial notes and two pages of handwritten comments by Strong
will be made available on the Overheard in Seville website.
KRISTINE W.FROST
Santayana.—When you say that "feeling" is "that in the nature of matter which makes
it possible for it ever to be aware" I am still in doubt as to your meaning.  What is
your criterion of possibility in such a case? The previous existence of something like
awareness?
Strong.—Not like awareness.
Santayana.—The previous existence of the "luminosity" which in awareness is
focussed into conscious feeling?
Strong.—That comes nearer to my meaning. But it is focussed into what is felt.
Santayana.—Into the qualities of experience?
Strong.—Into these, and also into that temporary being which they have when intuited
(and have not at other times).    This being is what I have always meant by
"luminosity".
Santayana.—Then you do not mean merely such qualities or arrangements as give a
normal occasion for conscious feeling—in a word, matter capable of being organised
into living bodies? If you meant only this last, I should agree.   But I don't think it
helps at all to produce awareness that there should have been awareness, or
something like awareness, earlier.
Strong.—As I have said, it is not awareness or something like it. But it is something
like the temporary being which qualities have when intuited.   And I do mean such
qualities or arrangements as give a normal occasion for conscious feeling; but I do not
mean merely these, for I think that in the occasion there must also be something to
account for and produce the temporary being—something like luminosity; like it in
kind, but not in status or in complexity.
Santayana.—There must be something to account for it; but not something like it. To
this last I cannot agree.
Strong.—That is because we differ in our epistemological principles.
Santayana.—What are the differences?
Strong.—I will state them as I at present understand them, and ask you to correct me
if I mis-state your views. We differ at three points. (1) You say that things are similar