Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 12 Fall 1994

              Pragmatism and Santayana's Realms
When I set out to read Henry's book, I wasn't looking for the Levinson I
found.1 Indeed, I presumed that the pragmatism issue would take centre
stage and dominate everything else. This is not the case at all,
notwithstanding the stress he puts on the theme. A much deeper concern, manifested
throughout the text, is the place of religion and spirit in today's world, and the
contribution which Santayana makes to this subject, with his personal account of how
they might best be placed in a poHty, a social context, and a private life. To this theme,
Levinson brings a welcome interest and expertise in religions, and an enviable
knowledge of both Santayana and his American contemporaries. It would be a pity if
disputes about Santayana's relationship to any other philosopher or group of
philosophers, a very secondary and elusive question, were to divert our attention away
from this theme, and Levinson's excellent focus on it.
About this question of pragmatism, I shall have little direct to say, eager though
I might be to set forth my position in the opposite corner from Henry. He has
presented the differences between Santayana and the pragmatists no less faithfully than
the similarities, as did John Lachs in Avila; but where is the common principle which
will allow a referee to count the punches which landed and render a decision on this
partly verbal question? My own view of the match would be filtered through
Santayana's realms of being, and I would see a one-sided fight.
Rather, my direct focus will be on Santayana's realms. One thing seems clear, and
might indeed be accepted by all: to the extent that one adopts as one's own
methodology something like Santayana's later ontology, to that extent one will shy
away from analogies between Santayana and the pragmatists.
Timothy Sprigge — some twenty years ago in 1974 — inaugurated a reading of
Santayana's philosophy which placed the main thrust on his hitherto neglected later
works, especially on Realms of Being. This approach stands opposed to a prominent
reading which places the better known and much earlier The Life of Reason at the apex
of his achievements. I count myself a follower of Sprigge on this point. Henry, I
would say, has affinities with the other viewpoint This is not to say that he is
unfamiliar with the later writings, for it is clear that he knows all of Santayana's works
exceptionally well. Nor does Levinson neglect the later doctrines concerning his theme
of how the human spirit might thrive in private life and in society. How could one
make such a claim, given the largely sympathetic scrutiny he has given to The Realm
of Spirit, to Dominations and Powers, and to other late works? I nevertheless say that
he is not entirely comfortable with the ontological method created and employed by the
older Santayana, which some of us see as one of the high points in modem philosophy.
The realm of essence, for instance, is seen by Henry as "more trouble than it is worth,"
and as leading one into a realm of Platonic myth. This is a commonly held view, but
I believe it is incorrect. Both essence and truth, I hold, are seen to be entirely free of
mythology and concealed posits, when they are juxtaposed with a full-blooded
1     Henry Samuel Levinson, Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life, (University
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1992). To be cited as SPSL.
This paper was read to the Santayana Society in Atlanta, Georgia on December 28,1993, in
response to the above paper of Henry Levinson.