Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 04 Fall 1986

              Six Aspects of
Santayana's Philosophy
With the forthcoming publication, at long last, of Santayana's complete
works, lovers of his writings are looking for some revival of interest in
this American philosopher of Spanish descent. A surge of renewed
attention and research has accompanied the Dewey Edition; perhaps there
will arise a similar interest in Santayana, who also was very widely
appreciated at one time, only to disappear almost completely from the
philosophical scene later.
Writing in 1974, Timothy Sprigge argued for the relevance of
Santayana's philosophy to contemporary debate, and listed six aspects of
his work of special interest: his treatment of scepticism, of essences, of
ontology, of materialism and epiphenomenalism, of spirituality, and of
ethical relativity.1 It is revealing to review Sprigge's list in the light of
more recent speculations; on some issues, philosophical debate has shifted
in the direction of positions earlier embraced by Santayana. His treatment
of some issues would surely be attractive to many contemporary
philosophers. Nevertheless there remain aspects of his philosophical
temper and technique which would be found much less attractive. I shall
look at these six issues, beginning with brief remarks about the last two.
Santayana's increasing focus, in his later years, on philosophical
detachment and on a spirituality partly derived from Indian writings, has
alienated some of his readers, and no doubt will continue to do so. For a
spirited attack upon the interpretation put upon his writings by these
readers, see the above paper by Richard Lyon. It must be recognized
that, in spite of the considerable attention he accorded to spirituality, he
insisted that it can only be given a relative importance by a naturalist.
Similarly frustrating can be the tendency, which steadily developed
after publication of The Life of Reason, to avoid taking any particular
moral position in his philosophical writings. He did not hide his own
preferences, but came more and more to regard these preferences as
biases legitimate for himself, but unsuited perhaps for others and hence
for philosophical advocacy. Here again readers may find excessive the
detachment of his later writings.
In spite of this reluctance to advocate his own political and moral
positions, it seems certain that his reputation as a humanist philosopher
will grow. His mastery of this area cannot go unnoticed at a time when
the interest of philosophers in literature and the arts is reviving. In a
previous number of this Bulletin, Irving Singer characterizes humanist
philosophy as "philosophy that addresses questions about the nature and
1 See "Concluding Remarks," Chapter XII of Timothy L. S. Sprigge, Santayana, An
Examination of His Philosophy, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974). Subsequent page
references will be to this book.